Why do we observe proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries instead of having progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? We answer this question by exploring the enforceability of di¤erent types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an in…nitely repeated game framework. We also search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under di¤erent conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, di¤erences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which we show to be the …rst-best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare. 
Introduction
The lack of a forcing authority in trade relations of world countries makes it di¢ cult to achieve a multilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that increases world welfare. This creates a structural problem of rules in trade agreements that will self-enforce the trading countries to achieve more liberal trade. In this paper, we study these self-enforcing rules with asymmetric countries from the perspective of bilateral and multilateral FTAs. In particular, we attempt to …nd an answer to the question of "Why are FTAs bilateral/regional/preferential rather than multilateral?" Before we can answer this question, since many trade models …nd a multilateral FTA to be the …rst-best solution, we need to know why bilateral FTAs exist in the …rst place. To better understand the characteristics of bilateral FTAs, consider Baier and Bergstrand (2004) who empirically …nd that the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a bilateral FTA are economically and signi…cantly higher: (i) the closer in distance are two trading partners; (ii) the more remote a natural pair is from the rest of the world (ROW); (iii) the larger and more similar economically (i.e. real GDPs) are two trading partners; (iv) the greater the di¤erence in comparative advantages; and (v) the less is the di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW.
The empirical …ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) For simplicity, we assume that the downward-sloped demand curve and upward-sloped supply curve of each good in each country are linear in price of the good. We show that international trade between any two countries is achieved through di¤erences in supply and demand structures of the countries. It follows that the equilibrium autarky price (for each good) in any country depends on the individual country speci…c demand and supply structure, while the equilibrium price (for each good) under international trade depends on the demand and supply structures of all countries together with country-speci…c tari¤ rates and transportation costs. We let each country to receive all the tari¤ income for the good that the country imports. Accordingly, the national welfare is de…ned as the weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari¤ incomes. Using this de…nition in a welfare analysis, we estimate the policy weights (assigned to consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income across countries) that are consistent with the empirical …ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) regarding bilateral FTAs. The estimation results suggest that the policy weight on producer surplus is much higher than the others. Using the estimated policy weights, we investigate for the economic conditions of our model under which bilateral versus multilateral FTAs may exist with self-enforcing rules.
In order to incorporate self-enforcement agreements into the model, we allow countries to get involved in a stationary dynamic tari¤ game, i.e., countries play an in…nitely repeated game for tari¤ rates. In this game, each country is able to compare future payo¤s out of a possible collusion (cooperation) with future payo¤s out of a possible deviation from the agreement. In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement, the trade-o¤ between the gains from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the discounted expected future gains from collusion must be balanced in a way that the latter should keep away countries from deviating. Within this picture, we ask the more-detailed question of this paper as "Why do we observe proliferation of bilateral FTAs between certain types of countries instead of having progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA?" We answer this question …rst by exploring the enforceability of di¤erent types of FTAs through comparing the minimum discount factor that is necessary to sustain them. After having such a minimum-discount-factor analysis, we go one step further by searching for globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements de…ned as the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under di¤erent conditions. For the impatient reader, our results suggest that transportation costs, di¤erences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA, which we show to be the globally …rst-best solution for several di¤erent cases of our model. Therefore, removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for countries to converge to each other (e.g., increasing internal and international stability, reducing poverty, investing in transportation technology, international di¤usion of production technology) should be the main tools.
Related Literature
Common questions that have been investigated in the literature are whether the trade liberalization is achieved through bilateral/preferential agreements or multilateral agreements, whether preferential agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks for multilateral agreements, and whether bilateralism or multilateralism is a better strategy for countries.
Since it is not possible to mention about all relevant studies, we will talk about a selected group of them that we think as best comparable to this paper. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) study a competing-exporters model with three countries to identify the di¤erent circumstances under which the preferential agreements can lead to multilateral agreements or block them. Other studies that investigate the relation between preferential and multilateral agreements in di¤erent settings are Bagwell and Staiger (1997a,b) (1999), Bond and Syropoulos (1995) , and Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001). All of these studies assume that countries can commit tari¤ rates under preferential agreements, hence, only the multilateral agreements must be self-enforcing, which makes bilateral versus multilateral FTAs hard to compare in terms of sustainability. In our paper, preferential agreements must be self-enforcing as well in order to make such a comparison. Another study is by Limao (2007) who investigates the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements on global free trade when countries are motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues. Limao argues that the preferential agreements motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues increase the cost of multilateral tari¤ reductions and, hence, decrease the likelihood of a multilateral free trade agreement. Compared to Limao, our paper …nds that bilateral (compared to multilateral) FTAs are easier to sustain even in the absence of non-trade issues. Another recent study, Saggi and Yildiz (2010) , focus on the comparison of bilateralism and multilateralism through trade liberalization. They employ a competing-exporters model in which tari¤ rates are determined endogenously. They argue that when countries have symmetric endowments, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade, but when countries are asymmetric in terms of endowments, global free trade is stable (for a large set of parameters) only through bilateral agreements. 1 This result is not consistent with the implications of our model where bilateralism is always easier to sustain compared to multilateralism in an in…nitely repeated game framework; nevertheless, our paper shows that a multilateral FTA with symmetric countries (i.e., countries with similar sizes and comparative advantages in the absence of transport costs) is easier to sustain compared to a multilateral FTA with asymmetric countries (i.e., countries with di¤erent sizes and comparative advantages in the existence of transport costs).
The relation between transportation costs (i.e., geography) and trade agreements has been previously studied in the literature starting with Viner (1950) (1981), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) , Krugman (1991 Krugman ( , 1993 , Summers (1991) , Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) , and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have attempted to …nd whether or not proximity between countries have made regional agreements more bene…cial compared to non-regional agreements. In particular, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) assign an important role to transportation costs in their analysis, but their study has been criticized by Berglas (1983) and Panagariya (1998) in the sense that the transportation costs have to be too high in order to talk about the e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade agreements. However, in our paper, we show that even transportation costs up to 25% of source prices can have signi…cant e¤ects and become an obstacle for a multilateral FTA in a repeated game framework. Besides, following Krugman (1991) , other studies such as Frankel (1997), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), Frankel and Wei (1997) have also advocated for the e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade agreements. However, building on the earlier critique in Bhagwati (1993) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) , Panagariya (1997) has shown that transportation costs are not di¤erent than any other costs and hence should not deserve any special attention in explaining the regional trade agreements. Since transportation costs are exogenous in our paper, we accept that they are not di¤erent than any other costs (e.g., standard gravity-equation costs other than tari¤s, such as cultural ties or networks), but the important point we show is that they still have signi…cant e¤ects on the formation of FTAs.
In terms of methodology, the common question in the literature asked is whether tari¤ reductions with nearby partners are welfare improving. Krugman (1991) , Frankel Sten and Wei (1995), and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have examined this particular question by considering whether exogenously given preferential tari¤ reductions are welfare improving in a model where there are di¤erent levels of transport costs between trading partners. This approach has been extended by Bond (2001) through considering self-enforcing agreements in a four-country endowment model. In particular, Bond (2001) assumes that the world is divided into two continents, with two countries located on each continent. There is a per unit cost on any good imported from a country on the other continent, but zero transportation cost on goods coming from the country on the same continent. Bond shows that Nash equilibrium tari¤s on regional trading partners are higher than those on the distant partners; one might anticipate that this fact would make it more di¢ cult to support trade liberalization with nearby countries, because the incentive to deviate at a given agreement tari¤ would be higher.
However, this e¤ect is o¤set by the fact that the welfare level under regional free trade agreements is higher than that with a distant partner. This is because free trade agreements with distant partners have higher external tari¤s against all countries, which leads to lower world welfare under distant free trade agreements. In sum, Bond (2001) shows that the equilibrium with regional trade agreements yields higher welfare. This paper follows a similar approach with Bond (2001) in terms of considering possible transport costs across countries, but our analysis di¤ers from his paper by considering (i)
an N -country-N -good model, (ii) a supply side in each country with di¤erent levels of comparative advantage and, hence, trade through the search for minimum prices, and (iii) di¤erences in country sizes. These extensions imply di¤erent results compared to the results in Bond (2001) : A multilateral FTA leads to a higher global welfare even with moderate transport costs (up to 25% of source prices), country size di¤erences (up to three times), and comparative advantage di¤erences (up to two times); however, a multilateral FTA is always harder to sustain compared to a bilateral FTA.
The Model
We Table 1 for convenience.
The Economic Environment
The demand for good i in country j is given as follows:
where we assume that the demand curve is downward-sloping and linear in price of the good, p ji is the price of good i in country j, j 1 is a parameter by which we measure the relative size of country j; A > 0; and B > 0. 3 Similarly, the upward-sloping supply curve of good i in country j, which is also linear in price of the good, is given as follows:
where ji 0 measures comparative advantage (i.e., a higher value of ji corresponds to a higher comparative advantage), and > 0. Note that in a special case of j = 1 for all j, we have N symmetric countries with the same size. According 3 See Gehrels (1956) (1957) ) and Lipsey (1957) for early theoretical models that compare the implications of zero elasticity of demand and nonzero elasticity of demand. Also see Panagariya (2000) for a recent discussion on the implications of downward-sloped demand and upward-sloped supply.
to the supply and demand functions in each country, the autarky price of good i in country j, p ji (a), is given by the following expression:
Since we assume that A > 0 and ji 0 for all i and j, the autarky price is positive for each good in any country, i.e.,
Each country can impose speci…c tari¤s on its importables, with t jk denoting the tari¤ rate imposed by country j for goods imported from country k (where t jj = 0 for all j). Moreover, trade between any two countries is up to an exogenous symmetric iceberg transportation cost, with jk denoting the cost from j to k (where jj = 0 for all j). In order to ensure that there is a single exporter of each good k, we assume that kk jk > ( + B) (t jk + jk ). 4 That is, because country k is the lowest cost supplier (including trade costs) of good i for all countries (i.e., p ji (a) > p ki (a) + t jk + jk when i = k for all j 2 Cn fkg where Cn fkg is the set of all countries excluding country k), country k is the single exporter of good i.
Therefore, when trade is achieved, we can write the price of good k in country j by the following expression:
Note that if j = k, then trade costs are zero (i.e., t jk = jk = 0), so that the price of the domestically produced good is
The market clearing condition for good i can be written as follows:
By using p mk = p kk + t mk + mk for all m 2 f1; : : : ; N g, we can …nd the source (i.e., factory gate) price of good i in country k as follows when i = k:
By the assumptions of the model introduced above, p kk is positive.
The volume of the imports of country j from country k is then given by the following expression: 4 We assume that any country k has enough supply of good k to satisfy the demand of good k in the global markets.
where
Note that the derivative of p jk with respect to t jk or jk is positive since j 1 for all j; i.e., destination prices increase in trade costs, and thus the volume of imports decreases in trade costs (and source prices) and increases in country sizes.
Optimal Tari¤ Rates
In order to go one step further and talk about optimal tari¤ rates in our analysis, we need an objective function for each country, which will be the key to our policy analysis, below. The natural choice is, for sure, the national welfare function, which is de…ned as the weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari¤ incomes. As in the existing literature, we let each country to receive all the tari¤ income for the good that the country imports. In particular, national welfare for country j is expressed as follows:
du is the consumer surplus for good k in country j; R p jk jk = X jk (u) du is the producer surplus for good k in country j; t jk = 0 if k = j, as before; W CS is the weight on consumer surplus, W P S is the weight on producer surplus, and W T I is the weight on tari¤ income.
Given the tari¤ rates of other countries, in order to …nd its optimal tari¤ rates (i.e., the best response function), each country j maximizes Equation 2.1 with respect to t jk 's for each good k 2 f1; : : : :N g. Therefore, once we change what is given as the tari¤ rates of other countries, we can investigate various cases by considering the best response of a country.
For example, if we would like to calculate Nash tari¤ rates under the case of no trade agreements, each country will obtain its best response function by taking the tari¤ rates of other countries as given in its welfare-maximization problem. As another example, if a group of countries get involved in a free trade agreement (e.g., a bilateral trade agreement), we can set the given tari¤ rates between these countries equal to zero (consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT) and calculate the best response functions of all countries accordingly in the welfare-maximization problem. We will employ such examples while comparing the likelihood of having free trade agreements under di¤erent scenarios, below.
The Stationary Dynamic Tari¤ Game
It is well known that repeated interactions between parties can be used to support payo¤s that Pareto dominate those obtained in a one shot game. Accordingly, we consider countries playing an in…nitely repeated game for tari¤ rates in this section. The repeated structure of the game gives more ‡exibility to our model in terms of incorporating the self-enforcement agreements. In this game, each country is able to compare future payo¤s out of a possible collusion (cooperation) and out of a possible deviation from an FTA. are the optimal Nash tari¤ rates between country j and country k, and t
represents the optimal Nash tari¤ rate of all other countries on good j (resp., k). In the context of a bilateral FTA, country j's welfare when it makes a bilateral FTA with country k is represented by W rates for good j and k (which are equal to zero in our paper since we focus on FTAs), respectively, and t
the optimal tari¤ rates of all other countries on good j (resp., k) that can be obtained by i.e., country j maximizes
In this game, countries follow a grim trigger strategy, i.e., if country j cheats on country k in a particular period, then, starting from the next period, both countries set their optimal Nash tari¤ rates, and no agreement can be formed in the future.
We focus on sustainable FTAs. In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement, the trade-o¤ between the gains from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the discounted expected future gains from collusion must be balanced in a way that the latter should keep away countries from deviating. That is, where j is the one-period value of cooperation for country j, i.e.,
and j is the welfare gain of country j from cheating to country k, i.e.,
In other words, for country j to have a cooperation, the minimum discount factor of country j should be:
In our analysis, in order to talk about the likelihood of an FTA, we will consider the maximum of the minimum discount factors across countries involved in that FTA:
where F is the set of countries involved in that FTA. If increases (decreases), the range of the discount factor within which an FTA is sustainable decreases (increases), and, hence, the likelihood of that FTA decreases (increases). 7 In the context of a multilateral FTA, country j's welfare when it makes a multilateral FTA is represented by W If country j cheats on a multilateral FTA, it sets its optimal tari¤ rate on good all goods t B j( i) , given t A ( i)j ; i.e., country
In the context of a multilateral FTA, as in the bilateral FTA case, countries again follow a grim trigger strategy; i.e., if country j cheats on all other countries in a particular period, then, starting from the next period, all countries set their optimal Nash tari¤ rates to each other, and no agreement can be formed in the future.
In this multilateral FTA game, we will allow only one country to cheat for simplicity; therefore, Equations 3.2 or 3.3 can be used to investigate both sustainable bilateral FTAs and a sustainable multilateral FTA. 6 Having a unique discount factor across all countries would result in the very same implications; nevertheless, we keep them country speci…c to show how each country is a¤ected in the repeated game in a transparent way. 7 Although we do not use the concept of "likelihood" in a statistical way, one can easily use it in such a way by assuming that 's have a standard uniform distribution.
A 3-Country-3-Good Example of the Stationary Dynamic Tari¤ Game
We would like to pursue an analysis of counterfactuals by considering the e¤ects of trade costs, country sizes, and comparative advantages on the formation of FTAs. Since the model is highly stylized (through simplifying assumptions to have a tractable framework), these counterfactuals may not correspond to de…nitive policy analysis; nevertheless, they will provide insight into the workings of our model, which is representative of studies based on self-enforcing rules in the literature (as discussed in details, above).
In order to keep things tractable, we focus on a 3-country-3-good version of our model. We have two options in terms of the presentation of counterfactuals; we can either present the policy implications of our model through closed-form expressions or go one step further by parameterizing the closed-form expressions so that we can focus on the implications of our model that are consistent with FTA observations in the data. We follow the second approach, because, given the model, we believe that it is the only way to have relevant policy implications that are consistent with the real world.
Accordingly, we follow a hybrid approach by …rst calibrating the non-policy parameters (i.e., parameters other than the policy weights in the welfare function) without loss of generality and then by simulating/estimating the policy parameters (i.e., W CS, W P S, and W T I) such that the implications of the model will match with the bilateral FTA observations in the data.
Parametrization through Minimum-Discount-Factor Analysis
We start with calibrating the non-policy parameters of A, B, , j (for all j) and jk (for all j; k). Without loss of generality, we calibrate these parameters such that (i) they satisfy the assumptions of A > 0, B > 0, > 0, jk 0 and kk jk > ( + B) (t jk + jk ); (ii) we have enough parameter space to perform di¤erent counterfactuals based on changes in transport costs, country sizes, and comparative advantage; and (iii) we have a simple and tractable presentation of the model. The benchmark values of calibrated parameters are given in Table 1 , where jk 's, j 's and jk 's are subject to change during the counterfactual analysis.
Given the calibrated parameters, we estimate the policy weights of W CS, W P S, and W T I such that (i) the bilateral- between 0 and 1 to perform a healthy analysis. We achieve our estimation through a global grid search by considering every possible value for each of our policy weights (W CS, W P S, and W T I) between 0 and 1 by assuming, without loss of generality, that their summation is equal to 1 (i.e., W CS + W P S + W T I = 1).
Getting into more details, recall that, according to BB, the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a bilateral FTA are economically and signi…cantly higher:
1. The closer in distance are two trading partners.
2. The more remote a natural pair is from the ROW.
3. The larger and more similar economically are two trading partners.
4. The greater the di¤erence in comparative advantages (measured by capital-labor ratios).
5. The less is the di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW.
Therefore, given the calibrated parameters in Table 1 , we search for policy weights (W CS, W P S, and W T I) that are consistent with all of these empirical …ndings. This requires connecting the concepts of distance, economic size, and comparative advantage to the relevant concepts in our model. Accordingly, in our model, we connect distance to iceberg transportation costs jk 's, economic size to relative size of countries j 's, and capital-labor ratio to the comparative advantage measures of jk 's. Using the calibrated parameters in Table 1 , we achieve counterfactuals for each and every possible value of W CS, W P S, and W T I between 0 and 1, and whenever our counterfactuals match with the empirical …ndings of BB, we accept the corresponding values of W CS, W P S, and W T I as our estimates.
Further details of each counterfactual analysis used in the estimation of the policy weights will be depicted in the following subsections; nevertheless, for presentational purposes, we here depict the estimation results in advance. The grid search results in W CS estimates ranging between 0.01 and 0.07, W P S estimates ranging between 0.71 and 0.77, and a unique W T I estimate of 0.22. 8 In more technical terms, these are the only values of W CS, W P S, and W T I that result in the counterfactuals (that are consistent with the empirical …ndings of BB) in Figures 1, 3 and 5 to be introduced and discussed, below. Given the model and the calibrated parameters in Table 1 , these "estimated" values correspond to the average policy weights across countries in the sample of BB. As is evident, the policy weight given to the consumer surplus is much higher than the other weights. In order to keep things simple, we will use the median of these estimates in our investigation; i.e., W CS = 0:04, W P S = 0:74, and W T I = 0:22. It is important to emphasize that our results are virtually the same if we use other estimated values of the policy weights, which are very close to each other anyway. 
FTAs and Transportation Costs
Our …rst goal is to show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent with the …rst two empirical …ndings of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then, we will focus on the global welfare gains of possible FTAs through investigating the e¤ects of transportation costs on the globallysustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements (to be de…ned below).
The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of transportation costs on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 1 . The exercise we have in Figure 1 is to increase the transportation costs between Country 1 and the ROW (i.e., j1 and 1j
for j = 2; 3) by keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (e.g., the transport costs between Countries 2&3 are zero, 23 = 32 = 0 ). We measure the transportation costs as a percent of Country 1 source price of good 1 under no trade agreements (i.e., Nash tari¤ rates).
As is evident, as Country 1 gets more remote, the minimum discount factor (i.e., , the maximum of the minimum discount factors across countries) to have a distant bilateral FTA between Countries 1&2 or 1&3 increases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a distant bilateral FTA decreases. This result is consistent with the …rst empirical …nding of BB, above. The intuition is simple: Nash tari¤ rates (in the case of no trade agreements) are higher for closer countries, because closer countries get involved in more trade between each other that result in higher tari¤ incomes. Accordingly, if closer countries get involved in an FTA, their gain from reducing their bilateral tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a remote country.
As is also evident in Figure 1 , as Country 1 gets more remote, the minimum discount factor to have a regional bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a regional bilateral FTA increases. This result is consistent with the second empirical …nding of BB, above, and can again be connected to the gains that can be obtained through reducing bilateral tari¤ rates between nearby countries.
Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
Although we have shown the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation across countries, we have not talked about the best alternative (i.e., Pareto optimal) trade agreements that are globally sustainable. In order to do that, we will focus on the global/world welfare de…ned as sum of the welfare of all three countries (i.e., P j W j ) in Figure 2 by using the same parametrization as in Figure 1 . The top panel of Figure 2 shows the welfare gains of the world de…ned as the one-period (which is proportional to lifetime) percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA. As is evident, independent of transport costs between Country 1 and the ROW, having a multilateral agreement is always the …rst-best solution, while having two bilateral FTAs, with one of the nearby countries (Country 2 or Country 3) being the hub, is the second-best solution from a global social planner's point of view.
Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we can obtain globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements in the bottom panel of Figure 2 , which is another representation of Figure 1 . Since this is the …rst time that we are introducing the concept of globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements, it requires further explanation in technical terms.
Speci…cally, we take Figure 1 , and we search for the welfare maximizing trade agreements among sustainable trade agreements (or the case of "no agreement" if all the minimum discount factors are greater than zero) for each point in that graph. For instance, since a multilateral FTA is the …rst-best solution, the area above the minimum discount factor line for a multilateral FTA in Figure 1 indicates the area of a multilateral FTA that is globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal.
Once the area above the minimum-discount-factor line for a multilateral FTA is assigned to a globally-Pareto-optimalsustainable multilateral FTA, we are left with two areas in the graph; one between the minimum-discount-factor lines for a regional bilateral FTA and a multilateral FTA, the other between a regional bilateral FTA and the x-axis. Regarding the former area, the welfare gains are higher than zero but lower than the gains from a multilateral FTA according to the top panel of Figure 2 ; hence, this area will be assigned to a globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable regional bilateral FTA.
Regarding the latter area, it does not coincide with any trade agreements in Figure 1 ; therefore, this area will represent no trade agreements.
As is evident at the bottom of Figure 2 , higher transport costs facilitate regional bilateral FTAs, and lower transport costs, in relative terms, facilitate a multilateral FTA from a social planner's point of view. Unfortunately, a multilateral FTA maximizing the global welfare for any transport cost is the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues.
Nevertheless, the di¤erent globally-welfare-maximizing FTAs have closer minimum discount factors as there are fewer transport costs between Country 1 and the ROW. Hence, the existence of transport costs is one of the obstacles for having a multilateral FTA according to this analysis, meaning that if we can reduce transport costs (e.g., through investing in transportation technologies), the likelihood of forming a multilateral FTA will increase in a global context.
FTAs and Country Sizes
This subsection will …rst show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent with the third empirical …nding of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then, we will focus on the e¤ects of country sizes on globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements.
The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of country sizes on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 3 . For our counterfactuals, we have to …nd a way to consider both sizes (in magnitude) and similarities (in size) of countries at the same time to test for the third empirical …nding of BB. Accordingly, the exercise we have in Figure 3 is to increase the sizes of Country 2 and Country 3 (i.e., 2 and 3 ) at di¤erent amounts (where 2 is depicted at the bottom x-axis and 3 is depicted at the top x-axis) by keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (e.g., 1 = 1). As is evident, as Country 2 and Country 3 get larger and more similar economically (i.e., as they approach having exactly the same size of 2 = 3 = 2), the (global) minimum discount factor to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. In particular, the left of 2 = 3 = 2 in the x-axes show a higher likelihood of having a bilateral FTA when Country 2 and Country 3 get larger, while the right of 2 = 3 = 2 in the x-axes show a higher likelihood of having a bilateral FTA when Country 2 and Country 3 get more similar in terms of their sizes (independent of the magnitude of their sizes). This result is consistent with the third empirical …nding of BB, above, and can be connected to the high Nash tari¤ rates between larger and economically more similar countries due to the having more trade between each other resulting in higher tari¤ incomes. 10 Therefore, if larger and economically similar countries get involved in an FTA, their gain from reducing their bilateral tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a smaller country.
Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the welfare gains of the world again de…ned as the one-period (which is proportional to lifetime) percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA by using the parametrization as in Figure 3 .
As is evident, having a multilateral agreement is again the …rst-best solution for all considered sizes of countries, while having two bilateral FTAs, with one of the large countries (Country 2 or Country 3) being the hub, is the second-best solution from a global social planner's point of view. Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we obtain globallysustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements in the bottom panel of Figure 4 , which is another representation of Figure   3 . As is evident, lower country size di¤erences between Countries 2 and 3 facilitate bilateral FTAs from a social planner's point of view. As in the case of transportation costs, a multilateral FTA maximizing the global welfare for any country size is the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues. Nevertheless, a globally-welfare-maximizing multilateral FTA has a lower minimum discount factors as larger countries converge to each other in terms of their sizes (e.g., when 2 = 3 = 2). Hence, according to our analysis, the existence of country size di¤erences is another obstacle for having a multilateral FTA, meaning that once countries will converge to each other in terms of their sizes (e.g., through catch-up e¤ects that are mostly possible when countries are stable in terms of their economic indicators such as in ‡ation, …nancial development, and government size as highly documented by the growth literature), the likelihood of forming a multilateral FTA will increase in a global context.
FTAs and Comparative Advantage
This subsection will …rst show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent also with the last two empirical …ndings of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then, we will focus on the e¤ects of comparative advantage on the globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements.
The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of comparative advantage on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 5 . In order to show the consistency of our counterfactual with the empirical …ndings of BB, we have to …nd a way to consider both di¤erences in comparative advantage among member countries and di¤erences in comparative advantage between the member countries and the ROW (i.e., a way that will control for the magnitude of jj 's while comparing their di¤erences).
Accordingly, the exercise we have in Figure 5 is to play with the comparative advantage of both Country 2 and Country 3 by di¤erent amounts, while keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (including the comparative advantage of Country 1 kept as 11 = 1). In particular, we start the comparative advantage parameter for Country 2 from 22 = 0:2 and decrease it to 22 = 2:2 along the way, and at the same time, we start the comparative advantage parameter for Country 3 from 33 = 2:2 and increase it to 33 = 0:2 along the way. 11 Therefore, we would like to have the minimum discount factor to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 having a concave shape in the following expression (adapted from BB):
where j j stands for absolute value. The idea is to have a lower probability of a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 when the (absolute) di¤erence between jj 's of Countries 2&3 and jj for the rest of the world (i.e., 11 ) is wider. As is evident in Figure 5 , as we move toward the edges of the x-axes (i.e., as there are greater di¤erences across countries in comparative advantages), the minimum discount factor to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 1&2 or 1&3 decreases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. This result is consistent with the fourth empirical …nding of BB, above, and can be connected to the high Nash tari¤ rates between countries that have higher comparative advantage di¤erences due to high trade volumes resulting in higher tari¤ incomes.
In particular, if countries that have higher comparative advantage di¤erences get involved in an FTA, their gain from reducing their bilateral tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a similar country in terms of comparative advantage.
As is also evident in Figure 5 , as Country 2 approaches the same comparative advantage as Country 3 when 22 = 33 = 1:2 (i.e., when there are fewer di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW), the minimum discount factor to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. This result is consistent with the …fth empirical …nding of BB, above. Notice that we do not see the discount factor having a lower value as the comparative advantage of Country 2 or Country 3 ( 22 or 33 ) approach to the comparative advantage of Country 1 (a 11 ); this is because the magnitude of the increase in likelihood of a bilateral FTA due to the larger di¤erence in comparative advantages (as we move toward the edges of the x-axes) is higher than the one due to having smaller di¤erences in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW (as we move toward a 11 = a 22 or a 11 = a 33 ).
Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
The top panel of Figure 6 shows the welfare gains of the world de…ned as the one-period (which is proportional to lifetime) percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA. As is evident, as we have closer comparative advantages across countries (i.e., as we move toward the middle of the x-axes), having a multilateral FTA is again the …rst-best solution, while having two bilateral FTAs is the second-best solution, and having a bilateral FTA is the worst solution from a global social planner's point of view. Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we can obtain globally-sustainable-Paretooptimal trade agreements in the bottom panel of Figure 6 , which is another representation of Figure 5 . As is evident, higher comparative advantage di¤erences across countries (moving toward the edges of the x-axes) facilitate bilateral FTAs, and lower comparative advantage di¤erences (moving toward 22 = 33 = 1:2), in relative terms, facilitate a multilateral FTA that is still the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues. Hence, the existence of comparative advantage di¤erences is another obstacle for having a multilateral FTA according to our model, meaning that once countries will converge to each other in terms of their comparative advantages (e.g., through di¤usion of technology across countries), the likelihood of forming a multilateral FTA will increase in a global context.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements through an in…nitely repeatedgame framework in a partial-equilibrium trade model considering transportation costs, country sizes, and comparative advantages. There are three main contributions: (1) Given the model and calibrated non-policy parameters, we estimate the policy weights on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income by considering the counterfactuals of the model that are consistent with the empirical …ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) regarding bilateral FTAs; we show that the weight on producer surplus is much higher than the others. To our knowledge, this is the …rst study estimating such policy weights in a model with self-enforcing rules. (2) We show that although a multilateral FTA is the …rst-best solution globally, bilateral FTAs are the agreements that are globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal for a wider range of parameters, while a welfare maximizing multilateral FTA is globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal only for very special cases (i.e., when we have very high minimum discount factors); therefore, a multilateral FTA is hard to sustain due to self-enforcement issues. (3) We show that transportation costs, country size di¤erences, and comparative advantage di¤erences across countries all contribute to having bilateral rather than multilateral FTAs. Hence, in terms of global policy implications, possible ways to increase the likelihood of a self-enforcing multilateral FTA are all based on reducing asymmetries across countries: e.g., (i) to invest in transportation technologies, (ii) have underdeveloped countries to catch-up with developed countries through pushing for their economic stability, and (iii) share technological improvements around the world, say, through patent agreements across countries, or through encouraging foreign direct investments from high-technology countries.
Nevertheless, our analysis is not without caveats. For example, we have considered common welfare weights on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income across countries for simplicity, but considering country-speci…c welfare weights would result in richer comparative statics. In any case, such common policy weights are still very informative:
Given the model and parametrization in this paper, the estimated policy weights correspond to the average policy weights across countries in the bilateral FTA data used by BB. Therefore, they are consistent with internal political forces of the considered countries on average. Since it would be hard to change such internal political forces through international policies and/or negotiations, the success of forming a multilateral FTA (rather than bilateral FTAs) requires e¤orts that are more than what an individual government's trade policy can achieve. This explains why trade agreements are brought to international negotiation tables together with other political, cultural or historical bene…ts/con ‡icts. Therefore, in addition to Limao (2007) , who investigates preferential agreements motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues, future research is required to focus on possible multilateral FTAs motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues.
Another caveat is that we have considered symmetric transport costs which are exogenously determined in the model;
as Panagariya (1997) has suggested, they may not be di¤erent than any other (non-tari¤) trade costs such as trade frictions (e.g., exporting costs), cultural ties or networks. Hence, in addition to investing in transportation technologies, working on eliminating trade frictions (as in gravity equations and/or as in Viner, 1950) 
